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During the first week of December, President Trump hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This contrast exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this squares with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This change is significant, but analysts caution it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Action

An analogous confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.